The 2^nd round of six-party talks held in Beijing from February the 25^th to  February the 28^th 2004, no substantial results came from the talks although the U.S. , Russia, China, and South Korea considered the second round of talks successful. All sides agreed to set up a working group, and to hold a third round of talks by the end of June.

 North Korea offered to freeze its nuclear activities in exchange for energy aid, and agreed to abolish nuclear weapons program while retaining its peaceful nuclear program, with a precondition that the United States gives an assurance of non-aggression and respect for North Korea sovereignty.

 The United States insisted on its old stand and did not accept less than the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of the North Korean nuclear programs including those for peaceful purposes.

 South Korea offered energy aid to North Korea in return for freezing of its nuclear weapons program; China and Russia welcomed the proposal.

South Korea also put a proposal on the table, the same that was put forward on the 1^st round that includes three phases:

 Phase 1: North Korea declares its willingness to dismantle its nuclear program and the U.S. states its readiness to provide security guarantees.

 Phase 2: North Korea would take the first step towards dismantling its programs by freezing its nuclear activities. Once verified by inspections, "corresponding measures" such as energy aid and other rewards would follow.

 Phase 3: The complete dismantling of North Korea's nuclear facilities is verified and all other related issues resolved.

 Russia wanted a written document that includes North Korea’s pledges for abandonment of the nuclear weapons program as well as a US assurance for North Korea's security; China proposed that security guarantee should be provided within the framework of both bilateral and multi-lateral channels.

Talks ended without a joint communiqué; instead China issued chairman’s statement.

 North Korea expressed its disappointment and a spokesman of the foreign ministry issued the following statement one day after the end of the talks:

We attended the talks with expectation that a frank discussion on ways of seeking a solution to the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. would open a certain prospect of settling the issue.
    Hence, we showed greatest magnanimity, clarifying its transparent will to scrap its nuclear program according to a proposal for a simultaneous package solution aimed to denuclearize the Korean peninsula and advancing fair and flexible proposals for implementing measures for the first-phase actions.
    China, Russia and other participants in the talks, therefore, expressed support and understanding of our reasonable proposal.
    However, the U.S. again insisted on its old assertion about the DPRK's abandoning its nuclear program first, saying that it can discuss the DPRK's concerns only when it completely scraps its nuclear program in a verifiable and irreversible manner. This threw a big hurdle in the way of the talks.
    It also absurdly asserted that it can not normalize relations with the DPRK unless missile, conventional weapons, biological and chemical weapons, human rights and other issues are settled even after its abandonment of all its nuclear programs.
    The attitude of the U.S. side towards the talks increased our disappointment.
    The U.S. side unhesitatingly said that it was not willing to negotiate with the DPRK, far from showing any sincere intention to settle the issue.
    The head of its delegation only read the prepared script without stammering and showed no sincerity, giving no answer even to the questions raised.
    The U.S. did not show any stand to co-exist with the DPRK in peace as it did during the six-way talks held in August last year but once again disclosed its ulterior aim to persistently pursue its policy of isolating and stifling the DPRK, wasting time behind the scene of the dialogue.
    The U.S. seems to calculate that the DPRK will collapse of its own accord if it wastes time, putting pressure upon the DPRK undergoing economic difficulties. This is little short of a behavior of a bat-blind person who knows nothing of the DPRK.
    The socialist system of Korean style which is guided by the Juche idea and where the entire army and all the people are single-heartedly united, true to the Songun politics, will never shake in any tempest.
    The U.S. seems to waste time in a bid to attain its political purpose but any delay in the solution of the nuclear issue would cause nothing unfavorable to the DPRK.
    This would give us time to take all necessary measures with an increased pace.
    Any further six-way talks will not prove helpful to the solution of the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. unless the U.S. shows its will to make a switchover in its policy toward the DPRK.
    In spite of this situation we consented to the time to open the next round of the six-way talks and to the issue of organizing a working group proceeding from the sincere and patient stand to seek a negotiated peaceful solution of the nuclear issue at any cost.
    It is difficult to expect that any further talks would help find a solution to the issue.
    The settlement of the nuclear issue will entirely depend on the change in the U.S. attitude.