There is no doubt that the use of force against North Korea was considered by the US, but given the high risks it is likely that the U.S. will not opt for a military solution to resolve the nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula.

 A military operation against North Korea might have for objective the full elimination of the  North Korean nuclear program (stockpile of weapons, stocks of fissile material, and the capability of producing fissile material), this can be achieved either by strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities, or by regime change as in the Iraqi case.

 I  Military strikes against North Korea’s nuclear facilities

 A military strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities present many challenges to U.S. military planners, three key issues would be involved in successful military strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities:

 - Planning and executing a surprise attack plan;

- Locating all nuclear facilities and nuclear weapons stockpile and fissile material stocks, and destroying them;

- Preventing or limiting North Korea retaliation.

  1)  Planning and executing a surprise attack plan

 In 1981 Israel destroyed Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq by pre-emptive air strikes, the element of surprise was crucial for the success of that operation.

 The U.S. has the capability to launch air strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities without using their military bases in Japan and South Korea (it could use its military bases in Guam) however, in order to protect its allies and its troops stationed there the U.S. needs to take more defensive measures in view of a North Korean retaliation, such measures could be the deployment of further troops and equipment behind the DMZ (the demilitarized zone), and the installation of further air defence systems; these military movements can be easily detected by the North Korean military intelligence, which may uncover the U.S. plans, and give North Korea the opportunity to prepare its military to counter- attack, and move some nuclear components from its nuclear facilities, furthermore North Korea could threaten to use nuclear weapons in case it is attacked.

  2) Locating all nuclear facilities and nuclear weapons stockpile and fissile material stocks and destroying them

 Most of operating facilities involved in North Korea’s nuclear program are located in the city of Yongbyon (90Km north of the capital Pyongyang), these include 5MW(e) nuclear reactor, fuel fabrication facilities, spent fuel reprocessing facilities, and research laboratories [North Korea has two other nuclear reactors, the 50MW(e) at Yongbyon, and the 200MW(e) at Taechon, who were under construction until 1994 when they had been frozen according to the Agreed Framework.], these are the most important infrastructures for producing fissile material (weapons grade plutonium) necessary for the fabrication of nuclear bombs.

 There may be other nuclear facilities that are in other areas, and are not located by American intelligence (North Korea makes extensive use of underground buried facilities to hide and to protect its sensitive military activities).

 North Korea has already extracted plutonium from the 8000 spent fuel rods and declared that it has nuclear weapons; obviously weapons’ stockpile and fissile material stocks have the best protection possible. The U.S. also accused North Korea of secretly developing a Highly Enriched Uranium program, such program could be conducted in small and separated underground facilities, and the U.S. has no idea of where this alleged program is being developed.

 Although North Korea has fairly sophisticated air defences, ultimately the U.S. would succeed to destroy North Korean nuclear facilities located in the open by using massive air strikes and cruise missiles, and could also destroy some underground targets by using earth penetrating bombs; during the 1^st nuclear crisis in 1994 U.S. Army Lieutenant General John H.Cushman linked the success of such operation to:

• Accurate targeting.
• Careful timing.
• Effective command and control.
• Simultaneous precision attack by stealth air and cruise missiles in sufficient mass.

 He also quoted as saying: “The window for this option -- namely the attack of Yongbyon and its like alone -- may be closing; the option must be undertaken before the DPRK has built and deployed in hardened and concealed sites, say, four or five nuclear-tipped missiles that can reach the South and possibly beyond and can then exploit their deterrent effect.”

 Given these facts it is logical to assume that North Korea would cope with pre-emptive strikes not by defensive measures but with a strong counterattack.

 3) Preventing or limiting North Korea retaliation

 It is very hard for the U.S. to predict the outcome of a pre-emptive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities since there will be many options available to North Korea, from limited counter strikes to an all-out war. After the Iraqi experience, the North Korean leadership is very concerned by the Bush administration policies of regime’s change, and will likely perceive a pre-emptive strike as the prelude of a decapitation strike accompanied by an invasion, therefore North Korea would not wait to massively retaliate using its abundant military resources.

 North Korea possess hundreds of scud missiles that could deliver biological warheads without being very inaccurate with a range between 600-1200Km, it also has dozens of missiles that could reach any American  military base in the region (South Korea, Japan and Guam). North Korea’s ballistic missiles program is very ambitious, it is believed that North Korea is developing solid fuel rocket which makes its missiles very difficult to detect by satellites and AWACS (air borne warning and control system) usually mobile  missile’s launchers are tracked by detecting tank trucks that fuel missiles]. North Korea is also developing ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), if deployed they could reach the American mainland with the capability of delivering nuclear warheads.

 Behind the DMZ (demilitarized zone) more than two third of the KPA’s (Korean people’s army) ground forces are stationed, with largely mechanized units equipped with thousands of tanks, and hundreds of pieces of artillery capable of delivering conventional and chemical shells to the South Korean capital Seoul.

 Not only the U.S. and its allies cannot stop North Korea from doing considerable damage but the biggest concern is the possibility of a nuclear war; North Korea believing that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons to destroy its retaliatory capability, could push it to resort to nuclear weapons. The KCNA (Korean central news agency) published an article about a pre-emptive strike allegedly planned by the U.S. in which nuclear devices are seized after a precise air strike and infiltration of special units, and neutralizing North Korea’s response by cyber attacks.

 North Korea nuclear posture is not disclosed, in all states possessing nuclear weapons the latter are on the hands of the head of state, however in times of conflict it is possible that those weapons are provided to the army which makes the possibility of their accidental use very high especially if communications with the high command are lost. After Cuba’s missiles crisis the U.S. and the USSR established a hotline in order to avoid an accidental nuclear war and mutual destruction, no such measures have been taken in the Korean peninsula, in addition some members of the Bush administration believe that North Korea did not construct the bomb or it cannot integrate it in a missile (payload of a missile is limited to weight and volume therefore miniaturization is necessary to mount a nuclear device into a missile).

 These uncertainties could lead an armed conflict in the Korean peninsula to a WMD’s war.

 Conclusion:

 Pre-emptive strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities can only destroy the capability of producing further plutonium in the future, it is very unlikely that a pre-emptive strike would succeed to eliminate weapon’s stockpile and the capability of generating enriched uranium (if any).

 The U.S. did not engage in such venture in the past and it is unlikely that it would do so in the future.

 II Military operation for regime change

 The U.S. can always pretend that regime change is the only way to disarm North Korea; it is clear that if the U.S. cannot succeed in a limited military operation it would be unthinkable to contemplate a full scale military operation.

 It is almost impossible for the American government to convince the American public and the U.S. allies in the region to go to war against North Korea for the following reasons:

·        The failure of the Iraqi campaign and the decline of support to the war in Iraq among the American public opinion;

·        The lack of trust in the American administration domestically and abroad, and the doubt on its ability to handle big issues;

·        The impossibility of fighting different wars at once due to the lack of military manpower and the difficulty of providing resources due to the growing budget deficit;

·        The objection of a military conflict by South Korea and Japan, and other regional powers such as China and Russia;

·        The high number of casualties among the South Korean population, and the American military;

·        The importance of North Korea’s offensive capabilities which allows it to launch pre-emptive strikes on the American troops present on the region before it can deploy further troops;

·        The difficulty of protecting the American mainland from North Korea’s ICBMs;

·        The high risk of escalation of a conventional war to a WMD’s war including nuclear war, and the impossibility of fighting in a very long conventional war;

·        The unpreventable damage to the northeast Asian’s economies, and therefore to the U.S. and to the world economy.

 Conclusion:

 The strength of North Korea’s Army, the 5^th largest army in the world with over one million soldiers mostly well trained and well equipped; and the possession of strategic weapons by North Korea make its invasion very unlikely to happen.

 The U.S. pondered on the use of force to halt North Korea’s nuclear program in 1994 during the 1^st nuclear crisis, and perhaps also considered air strikes on North Korea’s nuclear facilities in the end of 2002 or the beginning of 2003, but given the high risks and the unpredictable consequences the U.S. refrained from using force.

 North Korea reprocessed the spent fuel rods and presumably moved fissile material and weapons stockpile from Yongbyon area to a different location, which makes strikes against Yongbyon nuclear facilities ineffective, however, this does not mean that the only option left to the U.S. is diplomacy, the U.S. could try to impose sanctions in a bid to stifle North Korea and push its regime to collapsing, but sanctions cannot be effective without the cooperation of China and South Korea who are opposed to such actions.

 The CIA and other intelligence agencies were betting on the collapse of the North Korean regime by the end of the nineties due to what they described as the struggle for power among the party’s elite, and massive defection by government officials and party cadres, in addition to severe economical problems; so far these reports turned to be inaccurate, and the North Korean regime is steady and durable, and the North Korean economy is showing some improvements.